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Right of freedom of 
conscience ‘is not absolute’  
Dr Joan McCarthy, School of Nursing and Midwifery, University College 
Cork, gives her view on the issue of conscientious objection as new abortion 
services come into force in Ireland  
In the course of my work as a lecturer in healthcare ethics in the School of Nursing and Midwifery, University College Cork, I have met with a number of Irish health professionals – nurses, midwives and doctors – who are uncertain and confused about their obligations in relation to the provision of abortions 
services in post-2018 Ireland. Their questions have prompted me to 
explain and defend the standard account of conscientious objec-
tion that is articulated in the Health (Regulation of Termination of 
Pregnancy) Act 2018. To do so, I will define and discuss some of the 
key terms that are at the centre of debates about conscientious 
objection: “conscience”, “freedom of conscience”, “right of freedom 
of conscience”, and “conscientious objection” itself. 
Conscience and freedom of conscience
“Conscience” is characterised as an inward-looking faculty or 
process by which we can discern moral principles or truths. It acts 
as a moral and emotional compass that guides our actions and 
maintains our sense of moral integrity. “Freedom of conscience” 
refers to the freedom to act or refrain from acting according to one’s 
conscience. Accounts of the sources of moral principles, as well as 
freedom of conscience, vary. For example, the Catholic Church holds 
that God is the source of moral standards of right and wrong, and 
genuine freedom is exercised when an individual accesses God’s 
laws through their faculty of conscience and lives according to them. 
Alternatively, a secular perspective might include family, education, 
or culture as sources of moral principles and views conscience as the 
combined force of reason, emotion and intention that motivates an 
individual to act. On this view, an individual exercises freedom when 
they commit themselves to the moral standards and the moral life 
that they hold to be authentic and good. 
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Right of freedom of conscience
Concern about interference by governments and organisations to 
curtail individual freedom of conscience, whatever meaning we 
attach to it, has brought about the recognition of a “right of freedom 
of conscience”. This allows for the possibility of a plurality of moral 
and religious views that ought to be respected and it is protected 
by the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion” (art. 18). However, the UN also places a limit 
on the scope of this freedom: 
“In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for 
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society.” (art. 29)
In short, some limits are placed on the exercise of individual 
conscience when its exercise impacts on the rights and freedoms of 
other people.  The challenge then is to determine the precise scope 
of the right of freedom of conscience. This is especially pertinent in 
the case of individuals whose professional role and responsibilities 
directly impact on the lives and wellbeing of others. 
The state, for example, may afford a vegetarian complete 
freedom to decide about his own personal diet and refusal to eat 
meat. However, the question arises: if he works as a cook in a public 
hospital, should he be required to prepare and cook meat for the 
patients who are being treated there? Similarly, the right of an 
adult Jehovah’s Witness to refuse a blood transfusion on the basis 
of her religious beliefs is protected in ethics and law. However, the 
question arises: if she were a surgeon working in a critical care unit 
should she be expected to provide a blood transfusion to a patient 
who needs and wants it? Finally, in Ireland, post-2018, a woman will 
have the legal right to seek the termination of a pregnancy up to 
12 weeks gestation on request and on limited grounds thereafter. 
However, if a nurse, who happens to be Catholic and whose 
conscience would abhor a termination for herself, is working in 
a public hospital that provides for termination of pregnancy, the 
question arises: to what extent should she be obliged to carry out, or 
be involved in carrying out, a termination for another woman who 
needs and wants it? 
In order to answer these questions, we need to consider the 
meaning and scope of “conscientious objection”.
Conscientious Objection (CO)
In his book, Conscientious Objection in Healthcare (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), MR Wicclair explains that individuals engage in 
acts of conscientious objection when they: “(1) refuse to provide legal 
and professionally accepted goods or services that fall within the 
scope of their professional competence, and; (2) justify their refusal by 
claiming that it is an act of conscience or is conscience-based” (2011: 
1). Might the vegetarian cook, the Jehovah’s Witness clinician and the 
Catholic nurse refuse to provide legitimate professional services by 
appealing to this account of conscientious objection? To answer this 
question, the state has to consider the impact of such refusals on the 
rights and wellbeing of others – the patient who wants or needs to 
eat meat or the patient who wants or needs a blood transfusion or a 
termination. A balance needs to be struck between these competing 
rights and interests. In other words, the state needs to determine the 
precise scope and application of conscientious objection. In striking 
this balance, the state cannot allow anyone and everyone to refuse to 
carry out their professional obligations by appealing to their personal 
moral views. To do so would hold everyone ransom to the dictates 
of everyone else’s conscience – a deeply relativist and possibly 
dangerous position that could cripple every service that the state 
or anyone else provided. Indeed, the conscience of the vegetarian 
cook and the Jehovah’s Witness surgeon are usually not afforded the 
protection of conscientious objection in relation to their professional 
obligations. In practice, I imagine that in order to stay as true to the 
dictates of their conscience as possible, vegetarian cooks try to gain 
employment in vegetarian, rather than mainstream, restaurants, 
and, I hear from colleagues in the Jehovah’s Witness community that 
health professionals, who happen to be Jehovah’s Witnesses, tend to 
avoid working in critical care. 
The conscience of the nurse (or midwife or doctor), who happens 
to be Catholic, in post-2018 Ireland, however, is viewed differently 
because of the particular religious, cultural, and historical context 
out of which perspectives on the morality of abortion have emerged 
in this country. In her case, the state sets out the grounds on 
which she can conscientiously object in Section 22 of the Health 
(Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act (2018). Under Section 
22, the nurse is not obliged to “carry out, or to participate in carrying 
out, a termination of pregnancy” (except in cases of emergency). In 
normal circumstances then, the nurse who views abortion as a moral 
wrong can work in accordance with the dictates of her conscience. 
However, Section 22 also limits the scope of her conscientious 
objection to direct involvement in providing terminations. This 
means that the nurse is required to transfer the care of a pregnant 
woman to others who are willing to provide such services and it 
implies that she would also be expected to carry out other duties 
such as supervision and rostering. In placing this limit on the 
scope of the activities of health professionals that are covered by 
conscientious objection, the state ensures that the health, wellbeing 
and consciences of women who want and need these healthcare 
services are also respected and protected. 
To conclude, the right of freedom of conscience is an important, 
but not an absolute, right. It is a means of respecting the beliefs 
and values of individuals where possible and it is defended in 
most democratic and pluralist countries. However, the scope of 
the right of freedom of conscience is also limited – especially 
where its exercise in professional contexts puts the rights and 
freedoms of others at risk. Doctors, nurses and midwives who 
are currently demanding that the Irish government extend the 
right of conscientious objection beyond the bounds of Section 22 
are, in effect, claiming that their beliefs and values should trump 
the healthcare needs as well as the beliefs and values of patients 
in their care. However well-intentioned they may be, they are 
taking an absolutist stance that undermines the very freedom of 
conscience that they purport to defend. 
Finally, I want to acknowledge that many health professionals 
may not have envisaged that the provision of abortion services 
might be part of Irish healthcare in their working lives and that 
they are genuinely perturbed by what this may mean for them. 
I hope that what they may view as an insurmountable challenge 
today will, in time, be seen as an important part of creating a 
healthcare system that is safer, more egalitarian, inclusive and 
genuinely committed to respecting the values and beliefs of all.
